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Dumont: Reasonable Woman Standard

COMMENT

RADTKE v. EVERETT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION
OF THE REASONABLE WOMANNICTIM
STANDARD: TREATING PERSPECTIVES
THAT ARE DIFFERENT AS THOUGH THEY
WERE EXACTLY ALIKE
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone is prisoner of his own experiences. No
one can eliminate prejudices - just recognize
them. 1

Our society has recognized the evils of gender discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "is aimed at the
prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their
membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the
effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and
biases."2 "Sex" was included under the auspices of Title VII to
combat discrimination resulting from cultural prejudices regarding gender. 3
Sexual harassment litigation has forced us to reevaluate

1. Edward R. Murrow, News Commentary, Dec. 31, 1955.
2. Miller v. C.A Muer Corp., 352 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1984).
3. See House Legislative Second Analysis, HB 4407, August 15, 1980: Sexual
harassment should be explicitly defined and prohibited because it is a demeaning,
degrading, and coercive activity directed at persons on the basis of their sex, the
continuation of which is often contingent on the harasser's economic control over
the person being harassed. It should be outlawed because it violates basic human
rights of privacy, freedom, sexual integrity and personal security.
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the factor of gender in formulating judicial definitions of reasonable behavior. Currently, the circuit courts are divided
regarding the validity of adopting a female perspective when
evaluating sexual harassment claims.4 Since the late 1980's,
the federal and state courts, when determining whether sexual
behavior has created an abusive or "hostile" environment, have
gradually acknowledged that males and females perceive differently the types of sexual behavior appropriate for the employment setting. 5 Such acknowledgment has resulted in the
creation and implementation of the reasonable victim/woman
standard. 6
Since 1987, beginning with Yates v. Avco Corp., the reasonable woman standard (hereinafter "RWS") has gradually
gained acceptance by the judiciary. 7 The RWS, which is premised on the theory that males and females perceive sexual
behavior differently, deems actionable that conduct which
offends and intimidates a reasonable woman, including sexual
conduct which some males may not find objectionable. The
adoption of the RWS, therefore, has allowed women to estab-

4. The following Federal Circuit Courts have adopted a reasonable victim/woman standard. See, e.g., Newton v. Dept. of Air Force, 85 F.3d 595 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (adopting a reasonable victim standard); Burns v. McGregor Electronic
Industries, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a reasonable woman standard);
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (adopting a reasonable woman
standard); Jones v. Dept. of Army, 780 F.Supp. 755 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting a
reasonable woman standard); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486
(11th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable woman); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting a reasonable woman standard). The following
Federal Circuit Courts have adopted a reasonable person standard. See, e.g.,
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995) (adopting a
reasonable person standard); Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336 (2nd Cir.
1992) (adopting a reasonable person standard); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d
147 (5th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable person standard as opposed to a reasonable "church affiliated" person standard); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765
F.Supp. 1509 (lst Cir. 1991) (utilizing the "reasonable person from the protected
group of which the victim is a member" standard).
5. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. dissenting).
6. Because this note focuses primarily on sexual harassment directed at women, the terms "reasonable victim" and "reasonable woman" are used interchangeably.
7. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765
F.Supp. 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable victim standard); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).
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lish prima facie hostile environment claims that would have
been held insufficient under the traditional reasonable person
standard (hereinafter "RPS").8
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision to explicitly reject
the RWS in Radtke v. Everett9 illustrates an unwillingness by
some courts to accept this progressive instrument of sexual
harassment jurisprudence. This comment will analyze and
critique the Radtke court's rationale for rejecting the RWS in
favor of the RPS.
Part II of this comment will discuss both the history of
sexual harassment and the evolution of the reasonable woman
standard in order. to illustrate society's progress toward defining appropriate conduct in the work environment. 1o Parts 111IV will present the Radtke court's argument rejecting the reasonable woman standard in favor of the reasonable person
standard. l l Part V invokes feminist theory to critique the premises upon which the Radtke rationale is based. 12
II. BACKGROUND
This section illustrates how both the legislatures' and the
courts' interpretation of sexual harassment have evolved to
prohibit various forms of sexual behavior in the workplace.
Part A discusses briefly the history of sexual harassment law.
Part B discusses the evolution of the reasonable woman standard and how this standard has expanded the protective ambit
of Title VII to include sexual conduct which was not actionable
under a reasonable person standard.

8. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). The District
Court, using the reasonable person standard, granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, using the reasonable woman standard,
held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
harassment.
9. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra parts III-IV.
12. See infra part V.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5

258

A.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:255

HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARAsSMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Responding to society's need to equalize opportunities for
all persons within the work force, Congress included gender as
a classification protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (hereinafter ''Title VII").13 Under Title VII, an employer shall not discriminate against an individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex [emphasis added], or national origin."14 Title VII has eliminated a
wide range of impediments to gender equality in the
workplace, including inaccurately validated tests,15 seniority
systems,16 and gender-based height and weight standards. 17
The federal courts, however, have experienced great difficulty
in applying Title VII's language to sexual harassment. 18
In the early and mid-1970's, the federal courts dismissed
cases alleging sexual harassment on the grounds that sexual
harassment did not constitute a violation of Title VII. 19 For

13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703, amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1970 & Supp. II 1972). In relevant part the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge an
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
[d.
14. [d.

15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
16. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-59 (2nd Cir.
1971).
17. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F.Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1974), affd in
part and reversed in part, No. 74-1791 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1976).
18. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (1977) (reversed and remanded
the lower court's holding that employment conditioned upon acquiescence to sexual
requests does not fall within the coverage of Title VII); Corne v. Bausch and
Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161 (1975) (holding that Title VII does not protect a female employee from a supervisor's repeated verbal and physical sexual advances).
19. Kathleen McKinney & Nick Maroules, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL Co-
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example, in Barnes v. Train 20 , the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that a supervisor's
retaliation against a female employee who refused his sexual
advances was "underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship."21 The Barnes court reasoned that
the supervisor acted independently of his company's policies,
and therefore, his actions did not create an arbitrary barrier to
continued employment based on gender. 22 The court therefore
held that Title VII was inapplicable.
Similarly, in Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., the court
held that a supervisor's repeated verbal and physical advances
were nothing more than a "personal proclivity, peculiarity, or
mannerism" and that he was satisfying a "personal urge. "23
The court reasoned that Title VII applies only when the employer itself practiced the discrimination. The Corne court held
that even a supervisor's harassment was not actionable because such conduct had no relationship to the nature of the
employment. 24

Williams v. Saxbe was the fIrst federal court decision to
recognize sexual harassment as a Title VII violation. 25 In this
case, a supervisor retaliated against a female employee's refusal of his sexual advances by subjecting her to unwarranted
reprimands, unfavorable reviews, and ultimately to termination. 26 Holding that the supervisor's conduct constituted sexual discrimination within the defInition of Title VII, the court
stated,"[t]he conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor created an
artifIcial barrier to employment which was placed before one
gender and not the other.... "27 The holding in Williams suggested that Title VII would provide a remedy for women who·
suffered tangible losses (e.g. termination, unfavorable reviews)

ERCION

30 (Elizabeth Grauerholz, Mary Koralewski eds., 1991).

20. Id.
21. Barnes v. Train, Civ. No. 1828-73 (D.D.C.) (order of Aug. 9, 1974).
22. McKinney, supra note 19 at 30.
23. Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161, 163 (1975)

24. Id.
25. McKinney, supra note 19 at 30; see, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
27. [d. at 657.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5

260

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:255

as a result of sexual harassment. 28 The Williams holding,
however, only addressed an actual or constructive discharge of
an employee, and left open the question of whether a harasser
who engages "merely" in intimidating or offensive behavior
toward his victim has violated Title VII.
In 1980, in an effort to reduce ambiguity in sexual harassment adjudication, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission drafted guidelines for the purpose of defining behavior
constituting sexual harassment. 29 The guidelines describe the
types of workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title
VII, namely "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment. "30 Quid
pro quo sexual harassment exists when the sexual misconduct
of the employer or his agent is directly related to the grant or
denial of a tangible economic benefit to an employee. 31 A "hostile environment" exists where "such conduct has the purpose
or effect of reasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment."32 Although these guidelines are not controlling upon the courts, federal and state courts, as well as
state legislatures have looked to them for guidance. 33
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Bundy v. Jackson, interpreting Title VII, held that a "hostile
environment" existed when a plaintiff was subjected to sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions which
caused her anxiety and debilitation. 34 In Bundy, not only was
the plaintiff the target of numerous sexual advances by her
first line supervisors, but when she complained about these
advances to management, the supervisor dismissed her complaints and told her that "any man in his right mind would

28. The court was unable to provide plaintiff with a remedy as the parties did
not address what specific relief was appropriate. [d. at 663.
29. In defIning "sexual harassment," the Guidelines fIrst describe the kinds of
workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title VII. These include
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986), (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604. l1(a».
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3).
31. [d.
32. [d.
33. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
34. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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want to rape you. "35 The Bundy court found that such statements adversely affected the psychological and emotional work
environment. 36 The Bundy court analogized such intimidating
and offensive language to ethnic and racial discrimination
which indisputably pollutes the work environment, but does
not necessarily result in the loss of any tangible economic
benefit.37 Relying on the Fifth Circuit's holding that racial
slurs violate Title VII, the Bundy court concluded that sexual
harassment "which injects the most demeaning stereotypes
into the general work environment" violated Title VIl 3s The
Bundy holding indicated that the federal courts were willing to
apply Title VII prohibitions to verbal abuse based on gender. 39
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court invoked the
hostile environment category of Title VII in Mentor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 40 In Meritor, the Court relied on the
EEOC guidelines in addition to lower court decisions in concluding that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult."41 Quoting from Henson v. Dundee, a decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
the Court stated that "[s]exual harassment which creates a
hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is
every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. "42 The
Mentor Court recognized that not all workplace conduct that

35. ld. at 940.
36.ld.
37. ld. at 945; see, Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, 454 F.2d
234, (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Judge Goldberg explained:
. . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a work environment
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination ... [olne can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional
and psychological stability of minority group workers.
ld. at 238.
38. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945.
39. ld. at 946.
40. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57.
41. ld. at 67.
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(11th Cir. 1982».
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may be described as harassment affects a term or condition of
employment. 43 The Court stated that for hostile environment
sexual harassment to be actionable, the defendant's behavior
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."44 The Court, however, did not articulate a standard for determining whether a defendant's behavior created
such a hostile work environment.
The history of sexual harassment jurisprudence demonstrates that the judiciary has interpreted more broadly the
conduct prohibited under Title VII. The next section will discuss how the introduction of the RWS to sexual harassment
adjudication has even further expanded the scope of Title VII
protection.
B. HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD

In late 1986, five months after Meritor was decided, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 45 Ms. Rabidue claimed that a
co-worker's propensity to refer to women as "whores," "cunts," .
and other derogatory obscenities, in addition to the display of
sexually explicit posters throughout the facility, created a hostile work environment. 45 The majority applied a reasonable
person standard and held that the evidence, even when viewed
in a light most favorable to Rabidue, did not demonstrate that
"this single employee's vulgarity substantially affected the
totality of the workplace. JJ47 The court characterized the conduct Rabidue complained of as merely a legitimate expression
of the cultural norms of the workers, and that the prevailing
depictions of women in the media suggested that such conduct
was not unreasonably offensive. 48
43. [d. at 67; see Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("mere
utterances of an ethnic or racial epithet which engender offensive feelings in an
employee" would not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant
degree to violate Title VII).
44. [d. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, supra note 43 at 38).
45. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
46. Rabidue. 805 F.2d at 623-24.
47. [d. at 622.
48. [d. The majority stated:
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In Rabidue, Judge Keith dissented and proposed a standard of review based on the perspective of a reasonable victim
in determining the severity of the defendant's conduct. Judge
Keith stated that "the reasonable person perspective fails to
account for the wide divergence between most women's views
of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men."49 Judge
Keith stated that the reasonable victim standard would allow
courts to consider "salient sociological differences as well as
shield employers from the neurotic complainant."50 Judge
Keith also rejected the majority's reasonable person standard
as "enforcing an essentially male viewpoint under the guise of
universality,"51 by which the courts determine reasonableness
based upon prevailing social norms. 52
The Rabidue opinion is noteworthy because the holding
illustrates the limitations of the RPS in defining harassing
~onduct. 53 The Rabidue majority, by focusing on whether the
defendant's conduct violated prevailing social norms, ignored
the possibility that our social norms reflect a male perspective
of what constitutes appropriate sexual behavior in the
workplace. 54 The majority's analysis provided a vivid example
of how the RPS reinforces cultural norms that perpetuate inequality in the workplace. Furthermore, Rabidue illustrates
how the outcome of a sexual harassment case can be determined by the standard adopted by the court. 55

In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that
Henry's obscenities, although annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the
plaintiff or other female employees. .. [t]he sexually
oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the
plaintift's work environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features and
commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at
the cinema, and in other public places.

Id.
49. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626.
50.Id.
51. See also, Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1196 (1990).
52. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626.
53. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1193-94 (1990).
54. Id. at 1205.
55. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court of
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In the 1987 case of Yates v. Avco Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the same circuit that decided
Rabidue, adopted the reasonable victim standard in determining whether a constructive discharge resulted from a hostile
work environment. 56 The Yates court recognized that men and
women interpret offensive or intimidating behavior in different
ways.57 The court held that the severity of the defendant's
conduct should be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable person "standing in the shoes of the employee."58 The
court reasoned that the RWS should be applied since the plaintiff in this type of case has been discriminated against based
solely upon gender. 59
In 1991, in Ellison v. Brady, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted the perspective
of a reasonable woman for determining whether the
defendant's conduct was actionable under Title VII. 60 In that
case, Kerry Ellison, an agent for the IRS, received two "love
notes" in which a co-worker declared his romantic feelings in a
bizarre manner that frightened Ellison. 61 The Ellison court
relied on the EEOC guidelines and on lower court decisions
advocating focus on the victim's perspective in determining
whether the defendant's conduct had created a hostile work
environment. 62 The Ellison court found that a reasonable person standard is not only an insufficient standard for defining
unacceptable behavior in the workplace, but a standard that

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman standard and under
this standard reversed and remanded the trial court's order granting summary
judgment for the defendant.
56. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
57. ld. The court stated "were this a sexual harassment case involving a male
subordinate, the 'reasonable man' should be applied. We acknowledge that men
and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior."
ld.
58.ld.
59.ld.
60. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
61. ld. at 874.
62. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615, para. 3112, C at 3242 (1988)
(courts "should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of
acceptable behavior"). See, Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987)
(adopting "reasonable woman" standard advocated by the dissent in Rabidue). Cr.,
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221, 239-41 (1977) (en banc) (adopting reasonable
woman standard for self-defense).
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may condone the behavior Title VII aims to eliminate. 63
The court reasoned that women collectively share common
concerns regarding sexual behavior of which many men are
unaware. 64 For example, the fact that women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault suggests
that women may reasonably believe that a harasser's mild
behavior may foreshadow a violent act. 65 The Ellison court
stated that a reasonable person standard ignores the sociological experiences of women while it incorporates the perspective
of males who represent the majority of perpetrators. 66
Each citing Ellison, seven of the twelve federal circuits
have since adopted the reasonable victim standard when analyzing the severity of sexual harassment. 67 Three circuits have
adopted the reasonable person standard68 while the other two
have not committed to either standard. s9 The adoption of the
RWS suggests that our society is willing to reconsider the
types of behavior that it will tolerate in the work environment.
Due to the federal courts' decision to consider sexual behavior
from the perspective of the victim, employers have been alerted
that discrimination can result from abusive or offensive language,70 or from conduct (such as posting pornography) that
stigmatizes women as sexual objects. 71 The reasonable victim
standard allows courts to eradicate the more subtle, but equally discriminatory, forms of sexual harassment that place artificial barriers before one gender and not the other.72
63. Ellison, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. [d. at 879; see, Ehrenreich, supra note 51 at 1207 ("[M]any men ... tend
to view the milder forms of harassment such as suggestive looks, repeated requests for dates, and sexist jokes, as harmless social interactions to which only
sensitive women would object").
65. [d.

66. [d.; see, Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1989) (discussing how many recent judicial opinions reflect a tendency by judges to adopt a "male" view regarding sexual conduct in the workplace).
67. See supra note 4.
68. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.
1995); Trotta v. Mobile Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336 (2nd Cir. 1992); Murray v.
City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
69. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Circuit have considered the issue.
70. See, Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. See, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).
72. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
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In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question regarding the
standard to be employed in assessing harassing conduct. 73 In
Harris, the Court unanimously held that Teresa Harris was
not required to demonstrate that the harassing conduct of
which she complained had "seriously affected her psychological
well-being."74 While the Court did use the term reasonable
person in discussing the appropriate standard, a subsequent
sentence suggests that the Supreme Court has not ruled out
the possibility of adopting a reasonable victim standard. "So
long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to
be psychologically injurious. "76 The language "reasonably be
perceived" does not necessarily preclude a reasonable victim
standard as it implies a standard adopting the victim's perspective.
Furthermore, the Harris Court listed the following factors
to be considered when evaluating the circumstances of a hostile environment, including the frequency and severity of the
conduct, whether the conduct is "physically threatening or
humiliating," and whether it "unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."76 Such factors suggest further
that a reasonable woman standard is appropriate. For example, a female is more likely to be feel physically threatened
than a male under similar' circumstances due to the disparity

in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1400 (1992); See also
Ehrenreich supra note 51 at 1219.
73. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).
74. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one
that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.
1d. at 302.
75.1d.
76. 1d. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken
into account, no single factor is required.
1d. at 303.
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in size and strength that exists between males and females. 77
As the Court did not address directly the issue of whether a
reasonable woman standard should be adopted, the issue was
left open to future litigation and debate. 7s

III. RADTKE v. EVERETr
The Michigan Supreme Court in Radtke v. Everett expressly rejected both the efficacy and the validity of the RWS, holding that a RWS was not only unnecessary to sexual harassment adjudication, but antithetical to the intent of the Michigan Civil Rights Act.79 Part A will discuss the facts and procedural history of the Radtke decision. Part B will discuss the
Radtke Court's analysis and reasoning behind its decision to
reject the RWS.
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Tamara Radtke was employed as an unregistered
veterinary technician for defendant Clarke-Everett Dog and
Cat Hospital, P.C., beginning January, 1984.80 On Sunday,
May 29, 1988, Radtke, as commonly occurred,' was working
alone with defendant Everett to provide weekend emergency
veterinarian services. SI When Radtke suggested that she and
Everett take a break, Everett joined her in the hospital's
lounge and sat down next to her on the sofa. S2 Radtke believed Everett's behavior was inappropriate and attempted to

77. See Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1205 (1989). The author explains:
While many women hold positive attitudes about
uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual
encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have
reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography
industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion,
objectification and violence.
Id.
78. See, e.g., Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993).
79. Id. at 166-67.
80. Id. at 159.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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get up from the couch. Everett restrained her by firmly placing
his arm around her neck and holding her down. 83 After she
forcefully escaped his grip, Radtke rebuffed Everett's further
advances by stating: "You don't want to do this. I don't want to
do this. You're married. I'm married."84 When Everett responded by caressing Radtke's neck, Radtke again protested,
but Everett ignored her pleas. 85 Everett tried to kiss Radtke
by grabbing her neck and pushing his face toward hers.86
Radtke successfully pushed Everett away, and the working day
was finished without further incident. 87
In December 1988, Radtke filed a civil suit against Everett
and the hospital in the Grand Traverse Circuit COurt. 88
Radtke alleged that she was (1) sexually harassed in violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 2) constructively discharged on
the basis of sex; 3) the victim of assault and battery; and 4)
denied access to her personnel files in violation of the Employee Right to Know Act, M.C.L. section 423.501 et seq.; M.S.A.
section 17.62(1) et seq.89 Radtke's sexual harassment claim
was based on the theory that Everett's actions had created a
hostile work environment under Title VII.90
The trial court dismissed the Employee Right to Know Act
claim by stipulation.91 In August, 1989, the trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining
countS. 92 The trial court ruled that Radtke failed to state a
violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act because her hostile
environment claim was based upon a single incident of sexual
harassment, which as a matter oflaw, did "not rise to the level
of severity and persistence which would permit recovery. ~3
The trial court also dismissed Radtke's constructive discharge
claim because it was dependent on a finding of a hostile work
83. [d.

84. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 159.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

[d.
[d.
[d.

Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160.
[d.
[d.

91. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160.
92. [d.
93. [d.
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environment. 94 The court also ruled that Radtke's assault and
battery claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
the Worker's Disability Compensation Act.95
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on all countS. 96
Regarding the hostile environment claim, the court, sua sponte, rejected the Michigan judiciary's precedent of using a reasonable person standard in making the determination whether
a hostile work environment existed. 97 The Court of Appeals
found that under the reasonable woman standard, Radtke's
"single incident could be sufficiently severe under some circumstances to support a finding" of a hostile work environment. 98
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the Court of
Appeals' holding that Radtke had alleged a prima facie case of
a hostile work environment.99 The Court, however, rejected
the lower court's use of the reasonable woman standard. loo
The Court held that the appropriate standard to be used in
determining a hostile work environment was the "objective"
reasonable person standard, and that the "gender conscious"
reasonable woman standard was ''violative of the legislative
intent of the act, undermine[d] uniform standards of conduct,
and [was] ultimately unnecessary."IOI
B. COURT'S ANALYSIS

While the Michigan Supreme Court held that Radtke had
made a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, the Court rejected the Court of Appeal's adoption of the
RWS. First, this section will discuss the Michigan Supreme
Court's analysis of Radtke's hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Second, this section will discuss the Michigan
Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the RWS.

94. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160.
95. [d.
96. [d.
97. [d.
98. [d.

99. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 168.
100. [d. at 160.
101. [d. at 169.
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1. Radtke's Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
The Michigan Supreme Court began its analysis by looking
to the Michigan Civil Rights Act, which states that conduct or
communication of a sexual nature constitutes sexual discrimination when "such conduct or communication has the purpose
or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment . .. or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive . . . environment. »102 The court then laid out the five elements necessary to establish a prima facie case for hostile
work environment: 1) the employee belonged to a protected
group; 2) the employee was subjected to communication or
conduct on the basis of sex; 3) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; 4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in
fact did substantially interfere with the employee's employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment; and 5) respondeat superior. 103
The court found that Radtke's claim satisfied the first
three elements of the test. 104 The court also held that Radtke
satisfied the fifth element of the test. 105 The court thus
framed as its key issue the question of whether the facts of
this case supported the fourth prong of the test. 106 The court
was required to determine whether Everett "intended to or in
fact did substantially interfere with the employee's employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work

102. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 162 (quoting M.S.A § 3.548(101)(h)(iii».
103. M.S.A. §§ 3.548(103)(h), 3.548(202)(1)(a).
104. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 162-63 (Mich. 1993). Radtke met the
fll'8t element of the action because Radtke, a female, was a member of a protected
class. Radtke met the second element because she showed that but for the fact of
her gender, she would not have been the object of harassment. The defendant, a
heterosexual male, stipulated that his conduct was an "innocent romantic overture." Radtke met the third element as she provided sufficient evidence that the
sexual conduct was unwelcome. 1d.
105. 1d. at 168. The court held that the respondent superior element of the test
was met by Radtke because the alleged perpetrator was her employer. Everett had
the power to hire and fire Radtke and to control her working environment.
Everett also paid her wages and owned the corporation employing Radtke. 1d. at
169.
106. 1d. at 163.
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environment. "107 The trial court held that Radtke had failed
to satisfy the fourth prong of the test; a single incident of sexual harassment, as matter of law, did "not rise to the level of severity and persistence which would permit recovery."lOB
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding
regarding not only the fourth prong of the test, but as to all
countS. 109 The Court of Appeals adopted and applied a reasonable woman standard to determine whether a hostile work
environment existed. 110 Under the RWS, the court held that
"a single incident could be sufficiently severe under some circumstances to support a finding" of a hostile work environment. III The court concluded that the evidence presented by
Radtke satisfied all five prongs of the test and therefore was
sufficient to pennit a trial regarding the issue of a hostile work
environment. 112
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Court of
Appeal's adoption of the RWS and reaffinned the application of
the RPS. u3 Nonetheless, the Court did find that Radtke had
satisfied the fourth prong of the hostile environment test. 114
The Court held that a single incident of sexual harassment
could be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Michigan
Civil Rights Act if the incident was extremely traumatic, as in
the case of a rape or violent sexual assault.u5 Under the facts
107. Id. at 162.
108. Radtke v. Everett, Circuit Court for the County of Grand Traverse, Decision and Order on defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition, August 11,
1989, p. 2.
109. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160.
110. rd. (quoting Radtke v. Everett 189 Mich. App. 346, 355 (1991». The Court
of Appeals stated:
[A] female plaintiff states an actionable claim for sex
discrimination caused by hostile-environment sexual harassment under the state Civil Rights Act where she
alleges conduct of a sexual nature that a reasonable person would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment by creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive employment environment.

rd.

111. Radtke v. Everett, 189 Mich. App. 346, 356 (1991).
112. Radtke, 510 N.W.2d at 160.
113. rd. at 167.
114. rd. at 168.
115. Id; see, del Valle Fontanez v. Aponte, 660 F.Supp. 145, 149 (D.P.R. 1987);
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of the instant case, the Court held that Radtke had presented
evidence of an incident of sufficient severity to pennit a jury
trial. U6 The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that Radtke had alleged a prima facie
case of a hostile work environment. 117
2. The Radtke Court's Rationale for Rejecting the Reasonable
Woman Standard.
The Radtke court acknowledged that the standard to be
used in detennining the existence of a hostile work environment has been subject to debate. us Therefore, the court addressed the validity of adopting a RWS to detennine the existence of a hostile work environment. Relying on the language
and the purpose of the Michigan Civil Rights Act (hereinafter
"MCRA" or "the Act"), the court rejected a RWS. u9
First, the court held that the plain meaning of the MCRA
mandated the use of an objective reasonableness standard. 120
In its analysis the court referred to Webster's Third International Dictionary to define the words "hostile," "intimidating,"
and "offensive." Without any further explanation, the court
held that a close reading of the definitions mandated an objective examination of the reasonableness of the defendant's conVermett v. Hough, 627 F.Supp. 587, 605-606 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating "the requirement for repeated exposure will vary inversely with the severity of the offensiveness of the incident").
116. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 168. The court stated:
The alleged conduct, combined with the reality that the
employer was the perpetrator, permits the single incident
to be sufficient to reach the jury. Although the same
conduct perpetrated by a coworker might not constitute a
hostile work environment, when an employee in a closely
knit working environment restrains an employee and
physically attempts to coerce sexual relations, the totality
of the circumstances permits the jury to determine whether defendant's conduct was sufficient to have created a
hostile work environment.
[d.
117. [d. at 170.
118. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164.
119. [d.; see, M.C.L. § 37.2103(h); M.S.A. § 3.548(103)(h).
120. [d.; see subsection 103(hXiii) which states "Such conduct or communication
has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive ... environment." [d.
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duct as such terms are determined primarily by objective factors.12l The court, therefore, concluded that the requisite objectivity could only be attained under the RPS.122
Second, the court noted how Anglo-American jurisprudence
had applied a RPS for well over a century before the adoption
of the MCRA. 123 The court reasoned that if the legislature intended a departure from that standard, it certainly would have
explicitly mandated that alteration. 124
Third, the court reasoned that a RPS should be applied
because it is sufficiently flexible to incorporate gender differences,125 enabling the trier of fact "to look to a community
standard rather than an individual one. "126 The court reasoned that a RPS considered the "totality of the circumstances," and was therefore flexible enough to incorporate gender as
a factor without jeopardizing the stability of uniform standards. 127
Fourth, the court further supported its adoption of a RPS
by criticizing the objectivity of a RWS. The court reasoned that
only a RPS will prevent hypersensitive plaintiffs from recovering.128 The court stated: "[t]he alternative to an objective
standard would be to accept all plaintiffs' subjective evaluations of conduct, thereby imposing upon an employer liability
for behavior that, for idiosyncratic reasons, is offensive to an
employee. "129
The court further reasoned that a gender-conscious standard (e.g. RWS) unduly emphasizes gender and inappropriately
focuses on a particular plaintiff while it concomitantly undermines society's need for uniform standards of conduct. 13o The

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164.
[d. at 165.
[d. at 166.
[d.
[d.
Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166.
[d. at 165.
[d. at 164.
[d. at 166.
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court decided that "a gender-conscious standard eliminates
community standards and replaces them with standards formulated by a subset of the community."13l The court reasoned
that acceptance of a gender-conscious standard would lead to
the fragmentation of legal standards to the detriment of society.132 The court stated that "a multitude of ethnic groups,
national origins, religions, races, cultures, as well as divergences in wealth and education, would demand as many standards. ,,133
The court summed up its reasoning by declaring that a
gender-conscious standard is contrary to the intent of the
MCRA. l34 The court stated that a gender-conscious standard
could reinforce the very sexist attitudes the Act is attempting
to counter.135 The court declared that a RPS is permeated by
stereotypical assumptions of women which suggest that women
are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more protective standard. 136 The court concluded its argument by insisting that
"distinguishing women for special protection puts them back in
the disadvantaged position which led to the need for special
protection in the fIrst place. ,,137
IV. CRITIQUE
In Radtke, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly rejected
the rationale used by many federal courts for adopting a
RWS. I38 Courts adopting a RWS have acknowledged the validity of sociological research that demonstrates that males and
females interpret sexual behavior differently. 139 Therefore

131. [d.
132. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166.
133. [d. at 167.
134. [d.
135. [d.
136. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167.
137. [d.; see Dragel, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth
Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard be Adopted?, 11 J. L. & COM. 237, 254
(1992) (suggesting that the reasonable woman standard may reinforce the notion
that women are "different" from men and therefore need special treatment - a
notion that has disenfranchised women in the workplace).
138. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (1993); see supra note 4.
139. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco Corp.,
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those courts have extended the protective ambit of Title VII to
behavior which offends a reasonable woman, but may not necessarily offend a reasonable man. 14O This section will critique
the Radtke court's reasoning to show that while the RPS is, in
the abstract, sufficiently flexible to incorporate gender as a
factor, the RWS provides a more accurate reflection of society's
evolving recognition that males and females interpret sexual
behavior differently.
When the Michigan Supreme Court held that a RWS was
neither workable nor even necessary, it asserted that a RPS is
both an objective and effective standard for determining actionable conduct under Title VII. 141 The majority opinion implies
that sexual behavior is actionable under Title VII only when a
reasonable woman and a reasonable man would find that such
behavior adversely affected the work environment. 142 The
thirty year history of sexual harassment jurisprudence, however, illustrates how our society has gradually and necessarily
expanded its interpretation of sexual harassment to include be-

819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
140. See, e.g., Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1989). The author states:
While many women hold positive attitudes about
uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual
encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have
reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography
industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion,
objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group
tend to hold more restrictive views of both the situation
and type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate.
Id.
141. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1234 (1990) (stating
"the prevailing ideology systematically ignores differences among the citizenry as a
whole, promoting a homogeneous vision of American society that both excludes
those groups who do not fit the accepted American model and elevates a small but
powerful elite to the status of universal 'type').
142. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167; see Dragel, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard be Adopted?,
11 J. L. & COM. 237, 254 (1992) (stating that "[w]omen's experiences should be
encompassed under a 'reasonable person' and not merely a 'reasonable woman'
standard. Under an expanded notion of reasonable personhood, a victim's gender
would be but one factor the court considers.").
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havior that degrades and offends women even if men would not
be similarly affected. l43 The Radtke decision, by rejecting
such an expansion, fosters and maintains a body of law which
recognizes only the most egregious forms of sexual harassment.
This section will draw upon feminist theory in presenting
a counter argument to the Radtke court's rationale for rejecting
both the validity and the necessity of a RWS. The author will
demonstrate that the decision of whether or not to adopt a
RWS is much more complex than the Radtke court represents.
To end gender discrimination in the workplace, our legal standards must consider the perspective of the harassment victim,
not merely the perspective of those who engage in harassment.l44
Although the Radtke court lists five reasons for rejecting a
RWS in favor of adopting the reasonable person standard, the
court's rationale is based on only two premises. The first premise is that a RPS is objective, capable of accounting for differences within any given community. The Radtke opinion's first
three reasons for rejecting the RWS (i.e., the plain meaning of
the Act dictates the use of RPS, stare decisis requires use of a
RPS, and the RPS is sufficiently flexible to account for gender
differences) are based on the first premise. The second premise
is that a RWS is patently subjective, harmful not only to the
uniformity of the judicial system, but to the status of women in
society. The Radtke court's last two reasons for rejecting the
RWS (i.e., the RWS is unworkable, and the RWS harms
women's position in society) are based on the second premise.
A. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
IS QUESTIONABLE

The Radtke court's first three arguments advocating the
RPS are based upon the premise that the RPS is an objective
standard, a standard that reflects the acceptable social norms
143. See supra part II.
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
only examined whether a reasonable person would
conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the
tion." [d. at 878. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
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for workplace conduct. Unfortunately, the plain meaning argument and the stare decisis argument simply assume, without
discussion or textual support, that the RPS is indeed objective. l45 This assumption is disturbing in light of recent scholarship challenging the objectivity of judicial definitions of reasonableness. l46 Furthermore, this assumption of objectivity is
further suspect when one considers the holding of Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co. in which the court, applying a RPS, held
that a co-worker's misogynist obscenities combined with an
abundance of nude pictorials of women posted around the office
did not constitute a hostile environment for the plaintiff.147 If
the Radtke court has determined that the RPS is indeed sufficiently objective to further the goals of Title VII, then its reasoning should more comprehensively address the valid questions and concerns raised by critics of the RPS. l46
Regarding the third argument, the flexibility argument,
the court states that the RPS is "sufficiently flexible" to incorporate gender differences. 149 The court reasoned that the RPS
has been carefully formulated in order to provide one standard
of conduct for society.15o This is one of the court's stronger
arguments advocating the objectivity of the RPS, for some
commentators have suggested that the RPS is capable of synthesizing community standards. 151 The court's advocacy of the

145. See supra part IV.
146. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990) (stating
that "judicial definitions of reasonableness often reflect the values and assumptions
of a narrow elite"); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105-21 (1986) ("reasonable
resistance" necessary to establish rape is often defined as requiring physical resistance more typical of a man than a woman); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 623, 63132 (1980) (reasonableness standard in self-defense law restricting the use of deadly
weapons to situations in which the attacker is armed ignores the fact that many
women are unable to defend themselves from men without the advantage of a
weapon).
147. See supra part II.
148. See supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS (5th ed.), § 32, 173-75. The commentators
state: "The standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the
particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since
the law can have no favorites." Id.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283, cmt. c, 13. The commentators
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RPS, however, remains suspect in light of legal and sociological
scholarship. 152
Feminist theorists have challenged the objectivity of the
RPS, reasoning that judicial definitions of reasonableness often
reflect the beliefs and values of a narrow elite. 153 Some commentators have asserted that the RPS is nothing more than a
politically correct version of the reasonable man standard. 154
Furthermore, feminist critics have even challenged the objectivity of the term "reasonable."155 Indeed, in our male-dominated society, it is certainly possible that our conception of
reasonableness is gendered, reflecting our culture's emphasis
on rationality, as opposed to another criterion such as emotion
or morality.156 Such hidden biases inhibit the progress of sexual harassment jurisprudence because they favor a male perspective under the guise of neutrality.157 Feminists have attempted to expose this illusion of neutrality so that our legal
standards can be modified to correspond with women's lives as
well as men's.

state: "The standard provides sufficient flexibility and leeway to pennit due allowance to be made for such differences between individuals as the law pennits to be
taken into account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the case which
may reasonable affect the conduct required, and at the same time affords a forulUla by which, so far as possible, a uniform standard may be maintained." Id.
152. See supra note 145.
153. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990); see also
Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on
Self Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462-67 (1981) (legal abstractions like the reasonable man standard both hide and perpetuate existing
social inequalities).
154. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1405 (1992) (stating that the
reasonable person standard is merely a cosmetic improvement to a reasonable man
standard). See, Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 59 (1989) (stating that despite use of "reasonable person" language, court are evaluating a woman's conduct according to a male
standard).
155. Cahn, supra note 154, at 1405; see Ehrenreich, supra note 149, at 1192
(stating that the reasonable person standard in operation merely contains and
suppresses the contradiction between diversity and conformity, rather than overcoming it).
156. See, Bender, From Gender Differences to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol
Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. I, 22 (1990) (rationality is
not a neutral standard, and includes its own versions of emotion and morality).
157. See supra note 153, at 1178.
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Difference theories focus on the difference between men
(as a group) and women (as a groUp).158 Difference feminist
theory has been applied to demonstrate that the RPS may not
be sufficiently flexible to accommodate divergent perspectives
regarding sexual behavior, and therefore, is a particularly
effective theoretical underpinning for justifying the implementation of the RWS.159
Some courts have used difference theory to justify adopting the RWS. For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards 160, the United States District Court for the Eleventh
Circuit heard expert testimony regarding the influence of pornography upon creating stereotyping in the workplace. In holding that a hostile work environment existed, the Robinson
court accepted the premise that women view pornography in
the workplace differently than men. 161
The United States of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Ellison v. Brady 162 also applied difference theory to support
its rationale for adopting a RWS. In Ellison, the court held a
reasonable woman could consider the defendant's conduct,
which included the defendant's act of sending a number of
bizarre love letters to Kerry Ellison, "sufficiently severe and
pervasive to alter the conditions of Ellison's employment and
create an abusive working environment."I63 The Ellison court
rejected a RPS stating "[i]f we only examined whether a rea-

158. See Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 799, 807
(1989) (The author discusses how difference theory adopts positive attributes from
traditional stereotypes while discarding negative ones).
159. Cahn, supra note 154, at 1401.
160. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
161. [d. at 1505. The court stated:
Dr. Fiske's testimony provided a sound, credible theoretical framework from which to conclude that the presence
of nude and partially nude women, sexual comments,
sexual joking, and other behaviors previously described
creates and contributes to a sexually hostile work environment. Moreover, this framework provides an evidentiary
baBis for concluding that a sexualized working environment is abusive to women because of her sex.
[d.
162. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
163. [d. at 878.
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sonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct,
we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of
discrimination."IM The Ellison court explained that the differing perspectives of males and females regarding sexual behavior must be considered in order to make an accurate assessment of whether the victim's work environment was hostile. l65
Both the Jacksonville and the Ellison courts found the
RPS standard to be an ineffective standard by which to make
hostile environment determinations, and the outcomes of these
cases demonstrate the validity of this position.l66 In both cases, plaintiffs' recoveries depended upon the court's recognition
that males and females interpret sexual behavior differently.167 This principle suggests either that the RPS is not sufficiently flexible to achieve just results, or that the RPS does not
address the factor of gender appropriately.16s The fact that
the standard chosen can be outcome determinative suggests
that the flexibility of the RPS is suspect, challenging the foundation upon which the Radtke court bases its argument. 169
Both the Robinson and Jacksonville holdings illustrate the
obvious importance of acknowledging the existence and the

164. [d.
165. [d. The court stated "Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may

offend many women.". See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,
898 (1st Cir. 1988) ("A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great figure' or 'nice
legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive"); Yates
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating "men and women are
vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior").
166. See supra part lIB.
167. See, Robinson, 760 F.Supp. at 1505. The court accepted testimony that
"[m]en and women respond to sex issues in the workplace to a degree that exceeds normal differences in other perceptual reactions between them." [d. See also
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876. The district court, using a reasonable person standard,
characterized defendant's conduct as "isolated and genuinely trivial." The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that "in evaluating the severity
and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus on the perspective of the
victim." [d. at 878.
168. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that "[i]f we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in
allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing
level of discrimination." [d.
169. [d.
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validity of the female perspective when determining the existence of a hostile environment. 17o To ignore the differing cultural and physical factors that distinguish males and females
seems antithetical to the purpose of Title VII, especially when
it is those cultural and physical differences which form the
bases for exploitation. Because the RPS fails to adequately
account for a female perspective, the RPS can hardly be
deemed an objective standard by which to evaluate the existence of a hostile work environment.
B. THE RADTKE COURT'S REJECTION OF THE REASONABLE
WOMAN STANDARD AS SUBJECTIVE

The Radtke court attacked the validity of the RWS, claiming 1) that the RWS was patently subjective and therefore
harmful to the uniformity of the judicial system, and 2) that
the RWS was injurious to the status of women in society. 171
Regarding the fIrst point, the Court was highly critical of the
RWS as being detrimental to the uniformity of the Michigan
adjudicatory process. The Court claimed that the RWS cannot
be objectively implemented in a diverse society.172 The Court
reasoned that "the diversity of Michigan - a multitude of
ethnic groups, national origins, religions, races, cultures, as
well as divergences in wealth and education - would demand
as many standards."173 Moreover, the Court held that "one
standard of conduct has always regulated this diverse population, and to hold otherwise would weave great discord and
unnecessary confusion into the law."m
To justify its assertions, the Radtke court stated that
courts adopting victim-based perspectives have already begun
to fragment the reasonable person standard.175 However, the

170. See supra note 167.
171. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166-67.
172. Radtke, 505 N.W.2d at 166. The court stated "a gender-conscious standard
eliminates community standards and replaces them with a standards formulated
by a subset of the community. An acceptance of a gender-conscious standard and
the logic undergirding it would inexorably lead to the fragmentation of legal standards to the detriment of society." 1d.
173. [d. at 171.
174. [d.
175. [d. The court listed the following cases as examples of the fragmentation
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Radtke opinion fails to provide any evidence either that the
courts have had difficulty applying a victim-based standard or
that the courts have encountered any uncertainty or confusion
resulting from the practice of applying such a standard. 176
The court's second argument against the implementation
of the RWS asserts that a gender-conscious standard is antithetical to the purposes of the Michigan Civil Rights Act.177
The Radtke court reasoned that "[sluch paternalism degrades
women and is repugnant to the very ideals of equality that the
act is intended to protect. "178 To support its position, the
court relies on amicus curiae opposing the reasonable woman
standard on the grounds that it harms women's position in
society. 179
Indeed, even feminists have their own reservations regard-

of the reasonable person standard: Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F.Supp.
1509, 1516, n.12 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part, 765 F.Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991)
(utilizing the "reasonable person from the protected group of which the victim is a
member" standard); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F.Supp. 424, 429 (D. Ariz. 1992) (utilizing the "reasonable person of the same gender and race or color standard").
176. Id. The Radtke court cited to cases which adopted a "victim-based" standard to support its fragmentation argument. However, the court did not illustrate
or discuss any adverse effects resulting from the decisions of the aforementioned
courts to adopt a "victim-based" standard. Id.
177. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167 (stating that "courts utilizing the reasonable
woman standard pour into the standard stereotypical assumptions of women which
infer women are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more protective standard").
178. Id. The court included the following: "Furthermore, the 'reasonable woman'
standard may reinforce the notion that women are 'different' from men and therefore need special treatment - a notion that has disenfranchised women in the
workplace. Viewed from this perspective, a 'reasonable' standard may create the
perception that sexual harassment law allows special treatment for women."
Dragel, n.2 supra note 137 at 254; See also, Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the
Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB. LAWYER 203-204 (1992).
179. The amicus curiae University of Michigan Women and Law Clinic stated
the following:
There are disadvantages to tailoring the standard solely
to women. Being a member of a long-time disadvantaged
group puts some women in a position where they need
institutional support in achieving equality. However, that
support, in and of itself, can cause others to stigmatize
women a8 a weaker, less able group in need of protection.
In effect, distinguishing women for special protection puts
them back in the disadvantaged position which led to the
need for special protection in the fIrst place.
Id. at 167.
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ing the RWS and the possibility that it may entrench gender
stereotypes. l80 Commentators have identified some of the
problems that accompany the adoption of the RWS, including:
1) the RWS denies the needs and realities of women in order to
create them as del.icate, passive creatures;181 2) the RWS does
not accommodate the experiences of all women;182 and 3) the
RWS evaluates and standardizes the behavior of the victim as
opposed to the behavior of the harasser.l83 However, not all
commentators have condemned a RWS due to such deficiencies. l84
The fact that the Radtke court dedicated only one paragraph to support its holding that a RWS is harmful to the
status of women undermines the idea that it legitimately intended to enter the debate over the efficacy and the necessity
of the RWS. Furthermore, the "special treatment" argument
ignores the possibility that the conduct required under the
RWS may someday become the norm. l85 While the Radtke
court's intention to avoid building upon stereotypes of women
is laudable, it makes little sense to assert that the possibility
of reinforcing gender stereotypes justifies a rejection of the
RWS, for the very existence of sexual harassment is based on
the fact that such stereotypical ideas regarding women are
already held by those who harass women. 186 In other words,
180. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 154, at 1415-17 (stating "[w]hile the standard
nonetheless has enabled women to win some cases, and it may also depict some
valuable attributes that can contribute to new possibilities of lawyering on behalf
of women, its problems ultimately overwhelm its utility").
181. Id. at 1416; see Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the RejJublic of
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1581-84 (1991) (the author discusses the effects of
domesticity on women).
182. Id. The author states "[s]ome women accept as normal operating behavior
actions that other women would equate with harassment." Id.
183. Id. at 1417.
184. Id.
185. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991). The court
stated:
We realize that the reasonable woman standard will not
address conduct which some women find offensive. Conduct considered harmless by many today may be regarded
as discriminatory in the future. Fortunately, the reasonableness inquiry which we adopt today is not static. As
the views of reasonable women change, so too does the
Title VII standard of acceptable behavior.
Id.
186. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 18-23, 32
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it is disingenuous to assert that the best way to eliminate
sexual harassment is to ignore the existence of stereotypes
that promote sexual harassment in the first place. 187

v.

CONCLUSION

Sexual harassment is an invidious problem in the work
environment,l88 and our present methodology for handling
this problem is inhibited by our failure to recognize that men
and women perceive differently the acceptable level of sexual
conduct in the workplace. 189 In order to eliminate the effects
of gender prejudice, we must recognize how preconceived ideas
regarding gender operate within the dynamics of male/female
interactions. l90 Sexual harassment jurisprudence will become
a more effective deterrent to sexual harassment once the law
recognizes that males and females view sexual behavior differently.191 The RWS would require courts to recognize these sociological differences, and to consider such differences when
(1979) (asserting that sexual harassment is "a logical extension of the gender de. fined work role").
187. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1226 (1990). The author states:
If men are socialized to think that women should project
an image of sexual availability on the job, then it is not
that unusual to find that women feel compelled to do so.
Nor is it unusual to find men responding to that image,
and then blaming women as having "asked for it" when
they subsequently complain that they were sexually harassed.
Id.
188. Forty percent of female federal employees reported incidents of sexual
harassment in 1987, roughly the same as in 1980. U.S. SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 1N THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988).
Victims of sexual harassment "pay all the intangible emotional costs inflicted by
anger, humiliation, frustration, withdrawal, dysfunction in family life," as well as
medical expenses, litigation expenses, job search expenses, and the loss of valuable
sick leave and annual leave. Id. at 42. Sexual harassment cost the federal government $267 million from May 1985 to May 1987 for losses in productivity, sick
leave costs, and employee replacement costs. Id. at 39.
189. See supra note 165.
190. See supra note 187, at 1226.
191. See, e.g., Pauline Bart, et at, The Different Worlds of Men and Women, in
BEYOND METHODOLOGY 171 (Mary Freeman & Judith Wok eds. 1991). Pauline
Bart's research on women's and men's attitudes towards pornography shows that
they respond differently. For example, she found that 61% of men moderately or
strongly agreed that pornography has its place, compared to 29% of women.
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determining whether sexually related conduct has adversely
affected another's working environment. As long as we ignore
these differences, women will continue to live the effects of
gender discrimination under the guise of being treated equally.
As the Supreme Court observed in Jenness v. Fortson, "sometimes the greatest discrimination can lie in treating things
that are different as though they were exactly alike."192

Paul P. Dumont"

192. 403 u.s. 431, 442 (1971).
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